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Extract Secrets from Wireless Channel: A New
Shape-based Approach
ABSTRACT
Existing secret key extraction techniques use quantization
to map wireless channel amplitudes to secret bits. This pa-
per shows that such techniques are highly prone to environ-
ment and local noise effects: They have very high mismatch
rates between the two nodes that measure the channel be-
tween them. This paper advocates using the shape of the
channel instead of the size (or amplitude) of the channel.
It shows that this new paradigm shift is significantly ro-
bust against environmental and local noises. We refer to
this shape-based technique as Puzzle. Implementation in
a software-defined radio (SDR) platform demonstrates that
Puzzle has a 63% reduction in bit mismatch rate than the
state-of-art frequency domain approach (CSI-2bit). Exper-
iments also show that unlike the state-of-the-art received
signal strength (RSS)-based methods like ASBG, Puzzle is
robust against an attack in which an eavesdropper can pre-
dict the secret bits using planned movements.
1. INTRODUCTION
For wireless communications, there has been a great inter-
est in generating shared secrets from the physical layer as a
complementary approach to the traditional methods of cryp-
tography. The interest stems from the open nature of the
wireless medium and the infrastructure constraints associ-
ated with key management in mobile scenarios. There are
two main approaches for secret-sharing in wireless. One is
based on information-theoretic principles of exploiting the
secrecy capacity between Alice and Bob compared to Alice
and Eve [1]. The main drawback of this approach is that
secrecy is dependent on rather strong assumptions about
eavesdropper capability. Equally importantly, even a mod-
est increase in the spatial density of eavesdroppers harms
the secrecy rate of the approach dramatically [10].
The other approach is based on channel reciprocity. Chan-
nel reciprocity refers to the physical principle whereby near-
simultaneous observations of the channel by two commu-
nicating parties are identical due to the channel paths be-
tween them being symmetrical. Figure 1 in Section 3 shows
this reciprocity in our testbed. The time for which the
wireless channel remains correlated is called the coherence
time. By extracting channel state information from the ob-
served signals, Alice and Bob can share bits by transmit-
ting signals to each other within the coherence time. Fur-
thermore, extensive theoretical analysis and experimenta-
tion have shown that observations of the wireless channel
over distances larger than half-the-wavelength of the carrier
frequency are uncorrelated [11]. In a 2.4GHz ISM band, for
instance, at any location farther than 6cm away from Bob,
Eve will observe Alice’s signal through an uncorrelated chan-
nel. Channel reciprocity and spatial decorrelation together
make the wireless channel an excellent random source for
generating shared secret keys.
There is significant prior work that exploits channel reci-
procity for secret extraction. One set of techniques use
the received signal strength (RSS) as the secret source [2,
4, 8, 9, 15]. These techniques measure the received signal
strength over different coherent times to generate a sequence
of received signal strengths. They choose a threshold and
transform the signal strength sequence into 1s (if above that
threshold) and 0s (if below the threshold). The largest draw-
back with RSS-based techniques is that large variations can
be easily introduced by an attacker by blocking transmission
every now and then. These make the secret predictable since
the attacker knows the exact moments at which the signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) will drop or increase. Section 4 presents
this attack and shows this vulnerability. Even if there are
no malicious attackers, some unintentional regular activities
would also make the variation public. For example, SNR in
a corridor of a classroom building would be much lower after
class than during class.
Another set of techniques use the fine-grain temporal [13, 7,
6, 14] or frequency [5] components contained in received sig-
nals as the secret source. The temporal techniques use ultra-
wideband transmissions (≈ GHz bandwidth) to capture this
fine-grained temporal information. Therefore, these tech-
niques are not applicable for narrowband systes such as Wi-
Fi (with only 20MHz bandwidth). Furthermore, another
challenge in temporal techniques is that temporal informa-
tion is sensitive to sampling offset which leads to a high rate
of secret disagreement. In contrast, the frequency technique
of Liu et al [5] is applicable to narrowband systems and is
not sensitive to sampling offset. The authors quantize the
frequency response in each subcarrier in OFDM and map
them to secret bits. In Section 4, we dispute the authors’
claim of high secrecy rate and show that the secrets gener-
ated from their method is very limited.
Overall, this paper takes the stand that the amplitude (the
size) of a signal –in time or frequency– is prone to per-
turbations from the environment as well as hardware im-
perfections. This leads to quantization errors at nodes and
high mismatch in secrecy bits generated by wireless nodes.
Instead, this paper proposes to use the shape of a signal
to deduce secrecy bits. Specifically, we make the following
contributions.
• We propose and implement a shape-based secret extract-
ing algorithm called Puzzle that we show to be robust
to noise and device imperfections. In particular, no on-
line or offline device calibration is required in using our
algorithm.
• We prove that the power spectrum density (PSD) of ran-
dom data can be used to extract the channel state infor-
mation. This implies that no modification is needed for
the higher layers of the wireless communication, such as
transmitting special training data. Two communicating
parties can successfully extract secrets from the received
packets as long as they exchange data packets within their
coherence time.
• Our experiments show that Puzzle produces a 5-bit se-
cret per packet and has a 63% improvement in bit mis-
match rate than the frequency domain approach men-
tioned above.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider two wireless nodes, Alice and Bob, that wish to
create a shared secret S within a coherence time, during
which the channel is stable. An adversary, Eve eavesdrops
the communication between Alice and Bob. Our goal is
to develop a secret extraction algorithm that introduces as
little communication and computation overhead as possible
and ensures that Eve obtains little information about S.
2.1 Physical Layer Model
2.1.1 Channel model
Assume Alice and Bob operate in a Time-Division Duplexing
(TDD) system. If they talk to each other in coherence time,
the observed signals of Alice and Bob are represented by
yA(t) = (h ∗ xA)(t) + nA(t) (1)
yB(t) = (h ∗ xB)(t) + nB(t) (2)
where h(t) is the channel impulse response, which is iden-
tical in both directions by virtue of channel reciprocity, xA
and xB are the signals transmitted by Alice and Bob respec-
tively, nA(t) and nB are additive white Gaussian noise with
the same variance N , and “∗” indicates convolution. In the
frequency domain, the equations above are rewritten as
YA(f) = H(f) ·XA(f) +NA(f),
−W
2
+ fc < f <
W
2
+ fc
(3)
YB(f) = H(f) ·XB(f) +NB(f),
−W
2
+ fc < f <
W
2
+ fc
(4)
where W is the transmission bandwidth, fc is the center
frequency, and H(f) is the channel frequency response.
2.1.2 Channel Frequency Response
In this section, we propose two ways to extract the channel
frequency response H(f).
• Direct calculation: By using pre-defined training sig-
nals or decoding the received signals, Alice and Bob know
the frequency componentsXA(f) and XB(f) of the trans-
mitted signals. Therefore, they can calculate H(f) easily,
assuming that noise can be ignored.
• PSD based method: Let { x0, x1, ..., xN−1 } be a com-
plex sample sequence. Since the sequence is stationary
and random, the auto-correlation of the sequence is
R(t1, t2) =
P
N
× δ(t2 − t1) (5)
where P is the power contained by the signal sequence.
Then, the PSD of the sequence is
F [R(τ )] =
∫ +∞
−∞
P
N
× δ(τ )e−jωτdτ =
P
N
(6)
From Equation 6, we know that
XA(f) =
PA
W
, XB(f) =
PB
W
(7)
Combining Equations 3 through 7 we get
YA(f) ≈
H(f) · PA
W
+N, YB(f) ≈
H(f) · PB
W
+N (8)
According to the above equations, we conclude that the
PSD of yA(t) is the same as that of yB(t) as long as
PA = PB . It is worth noting that even if PA 6= PB,
the shape of Alice’s and of Bob’s PSD are still similar.
This property is remarkable because it can be extended
to the case in which Alice and Bob experience different
levels of transmission power, noise or cross-band interfer-
ence. Even in such cases, the shapes still don’t change
significantly.
2.2 Threat Model
Eve is motivated to derive the shared secret generated by
Alice and Bob. There are two main ways of achieving this.
2.2.1 Eavesdropping
Eve can attempt to derive ChAB from ChAE or ChBE ,
where ChAB , ChAE , and ChBE denote the channel from
Alice to Bob, Alice to Eve, and Bob to Eve, respectively.
This may be possible if Eve has full knowledge of the envi-
ronment. In general, however, full knowledge of the environ-
ment is a rather unrealistic assumption, so we do not regard
it as the main threat to our system. Instead, we focus on the
threat of spatial correlation of the secrets produced by our
algorithm. We assume that Eve cannot stalk Alice or Bob to
being within half of a wave length of either of them. This as-
sumption is reasonable since close eavesdroppers suffer from
a high exposure risk. Recall that theory [11] supports that
channels decorrelate beyond half a wavelength.
2.2.2 Planned movement
Eve can move in between Alice and Bob to block and unblock
their transmissions. Planned movements can thus introduce
predictable increase or decrease of RSS at Alice and Bob.
Note that while this attack is harmful to RSS-based meth-
ods, without the full knowledge about the environment, Eve
cannot, however, predict the impact of the planned move on
the frequency response of the channel.
3. SECRET GENERATION
After getting the frequency response curve of the received
samples, we smoothen the curve, encode the smoothed curve
by segmenting it into several pieces, and then map each of
the pieces into one of the patterns from a predetermined set.
Note from Fig. 1 that although channel reciprocity is clearly
apparent for the naked eye, the frequency response curves
are more or less shifted or zoomed versions at correspond-
ing frequencies. Moreover, distinct local fluctuations exist.
These discrepancies are unavoidable because they sponta-
neously result from the hardware imperfections and envi-
ronment interferences. This shows that direct quantization
and mapping of the frequency response can lead to high mis-
match rates. We, therefore, develop a shape-based approach
to solve the encoding problem.
3.1 Curve Smoothing
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Figure 1: Lowess curves derived by Alice and Bob. Lowess
curves are much more similar to each other than the original
PSD curves as local variations are removed.
Algorithm 1: CurveCoding
Input:
complex samples a[0, · · · , n];
number of segments m;
Output:
code [C1, C2, · · · , Cm]
Initialization
divide a[0, · · · , n] into m segments b1,b2,· · · ,bm;
peak = { Max1(a[0, · · · , n]) - Min1(a[0, · · · , n])}
PatternGeneration(⌊n/m⌋,m, peak):
generate 3 patterns of size ⌊n/m⌋: p1,p2,p3;
for i← 1 to m do
temp = ∞;
for j = 1→ 3 do
dis = Fre´chet(bi,pj);
if temp > dis then
temp = dis;
Ci = j;
end
end
end
As mentioned above, even though local details of a power
spectral density pair are significantly different, channel reci-
procity manifests itself by the similarity of the overall shapes
between the pair. By plotting smoothed points, confor-
mal information about the overall shape is extracted de-
spite the local variations. In our algorithm, we adopt Lo-
cally Weighted Scatter Plot (Lowess) smoothing [3], a curve
fitting method that calculates the smoothed value by apply-
ing locally weighted regression over a span. Fig. 1 depicts
two PSD curves obtained by two communicating wireless
nodes and their corresponding curves after applying Lowess
smoothing with a span of 0.4. From Fig. 1, we can see that
the Lowess curves coincide with each other almost exactly
and the overall shapes are preserved, even though the origi-
nal ones differ from each other in most of the locations.
3.2 Curve Encoding
By using curve smoothing, we obtain two highly similar
curves. To solve the encoding problem, let us first briefly
consider several alternative methods: 1) encode in accor-
dance with an approximation function that describes the
curve; 2) encode in accordance with the statistical proper-
ties of the curve; 3) encode by describing the shape of the
Algorithm 2: PatternGeneration
Input:
k, m, peak;
Output:
3 patterns p1[1, · · · , k], p2[1, · · · , k], p3[1, · · · , k]
for i← 1 to k do
p1[i] =
peak × i
k
;
p2[i] = −
peak × i
k
;
p3[i] =
peak
m/2
;
end
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Figure 2: An example of curve encoding.
response. We adopt the third one for the following reason.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, channel reciprocity is readily
seen by the similarity of the overall shapes between curves.
Hence, encoding by describing the shape should preserve
most of the information shared by the two ends. By way
of contrast, extracting secrets from the statistical proper-
ties definitely suffers from losing much of the mutual infor-
mation. And the approximation function does not tolerate
even small deviations, but measurement error and interfer-
ence make such deviations quite common. Fig. 2 gives an
example of curve coding. The curve obtained in a certain
band is treated as a block, which can be divided into vary-
ing number of segments of equal length, and then the seg-
ments are mapped to one of three curve patterns which are
of the same length, as shown in Fig. 2. These three patterns
are indexed as 0, 1, and 2. The three “predetermined” pat-
terns describe the ascending, descending and steady trend of
the curves respectively. By “predetermined”, we mean that
the indices and the shapes of the patterns are well known
to all wireless nodes. The gradient of the ascending and
descending lines, however, is decided by each node accord-
ing to the maximum and minimum values of the smoothed
curve, and the length of the segment. We have designed that
pattern generation thus to tolerate measurement errors and
different device settings. For example, two communicating
nodes may wish to use different tx/rx gains that would am-
plify the signals differently. Since each pattern is related
to the locally received signals, it describes the shape cor-
rectly without the need to negotiate with the other node.
We set the gradient of the ascending pattern to be relative
to max−min
# of samples in each segment
, and likewise for the descend-
ing pattern is relative to − max−min
# of samples in each segment
. The
segment is then mapped to the most similar of the three
patterns by measuring the discrete Fre´chet distance [12] δdF
between the segment and the patterns, which measures the
similarity of two polygonal curves while taking the location
and ordering of the points along the curves into considera-
tion. The smaller the distance, the more is the similarity
the two curves share. The complete algorithm is presented
in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.
4. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
In this section we study four important metrics to measure
the performance of Puzzle.
• Entropy: Entropy measures the unpredictability of a
random variable X. It is defined as
H(X) = −
n∑
i=1
p(xi) log2 p(xi)
where x1, · · · , xn are possible values of X.
• Bit Mismatch Rate: Bit mismatch rate is defined as
the ratio of the number of bits between Alice and Bob
that do not match and the number of bits extracted from
the shape of the spectrum.
• Correlation: Correlation ρx,y is defined as
ρx,y =
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)√
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2
n∑
i=1
(yi − y¯)2
We use correlation to measure the dependence of codes
generated by Puzzle relative to different distance between
Bob and Eve.
• Leakage: Letting pmis be the mismatch rate between
Alice and Eve, we define the leakage between them as
leakage =
{
1− pmis
0.5
if pmis < 0.5
0 otherwise
4.1 Environment and System
The measurement environment is a lab where there are 6
cubicles. Data were collected during daytime (from 7:00 am
to 6:00 pm). Human activities introduced a certain level of
interference in the channel, but generally speaking, the en-
vironment is quite stable. We conducted the experiment in
such a stable environment because we wanted to see clearly
the performance comparisons without risking mismatches
caused by the changes of the channel itself. In theory, fur-
ther implementation in mobile environment would give both
higher mismatch rate and higher secret bit extraction rate.
The communication system consists of three software-defined
transceivers. Each of their RF chains contains an XCVR2450
(RF front end), a NI-5781 (data converter module) and
an NI PXIe-7965R (a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA). Two of the
three transceivers transmit at 2.45 GHz with 20MHz band-
width. We call these two transceivers Alice and Bob. The
third transceiver, Eve, overhears the communication. Dur-
ing reception, each transceiver records the I and Q samples
at a sampling rate of 100 MHz and down converts to the
baseband. The received samples are then sent to the NI
PXIe-8133, an RTOS-based controller, through two direct-
memory-access (DMA) channels, which have a data stream-
ing rate that is as high as 800 MB/s. Except for the ex-
periment done in Section 4.2.1, all the results of Puzzle are
obtained based on the PSD of 10240 received samples with
QPSK modulation.
4.2 Performance Evaluation
4.2.1 Entropy and mismatch rate
We first compare Puzzle with the frequency domain secret
key generation method with 2-bit quantization [5], which
in the rest of this paper we refer to as the CSI-2bit. We
choose CSI-2bit as the basis for bit mismatch rate and en-
tropy comparison because, to the best of our knowledge, it
achieves the highest bit generation rate along with a low
mismatch rate. Coarse-grained method like RSS-based ones
achieve only 1∼3 bits per packet. We conducted an exper-
iment where packets were transmitted over coherence time
using OFDM in a 20MHz band, with each OFDM symbol
consisting of of 72 subcarriers. A channel frequency response
is extracted from each OFDM subcarrier. The same chan-
nel frequency response was used in both Puzzle (to construct
curves) and CSI-2bit (to quantize the response). By dividing
the curve composed of the 72 channel frequency responses
into a certain number of segments of even length for Puzzle,
and by selecting a certain number of frequency responses
evenly from all the 72 subcarriers for CSI-2bit, we extracted
the respective secrets from each packet for the two methods,
thus obtaining secrets of different lengths. No device cali-
bration is done as it is orthogonal to the secrecy metrics we
wish to compare.
Fig. 3a shows that Puzzle outperforms CSI-2bit in bit mis-
match rate for bit generate rates from 8bit/pkt to 56bit/pkt.
On average, Puzzle has a 63% lower bit mismatch rate than
CSI-2bit. It is worth noting CSI-2bit has an option of on-
line device calibration but that procedure requires the two
communicating nodes collect CSI over hundreds of coherence
intervals, therefore it has high overhead and is not practical
for fast secret sharing.
From Fig. 3b, we first see that Puzzle produces a compa-
rable amount of entropy as CSI-2bit does. It implies that
shape-based method does not harm the entropy compared
to quantization-based method. Another thing we notice is
that, the entropy of the generated bits does not increase lin-
early with the number of bits used to encode them. This
is caused by the fact that neighboring subcarriers are cor-
related. Therefore, the claim made by Liu et al [5] that,
CSI-2bit can generate 60-bit secret per packet by using 30
subcarriers in a 20MHz band, is not accurate. Fig. 3b shows
that for a 14-bit code generated by Puzzle or CSI-2bit, the
real secret contained in it, is not longer than 5-bit. And the
entropy is saturating as the bit generation rate increases.
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Figure 3: Bit Mismatch Rate and Entropy
4.2.2 Correlation of codes relative to distance
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Figure 4: Deployment and result of correlation experiment
To evaluate the resistance to an eavesdropping attacker, we
establish the correlation of bits generated by two receivers
at different distances. We performed an experiment where
we fixed the distance between one transmitter and one re-
ceiver, and then placed another receiver at a certain dis-
tance away from the first receiver along 6 orientations as
shown in Fig. 4a. Each frequency response curve is seg-
mented into 4 pieces. We measured the correlation between
the codes produced by the two receivers at distances rang-
ing from 5cm away to 45cm away. To be more specific, we
measured the correlation of 6 pairs of locations by fixing
the first receiver and moving the second one 60◦ apart at
each distance. Figure 4b shows the result. We see that the
correlation decreases rapidly as the distance between two
receivers increases. In practice, it is reasonable to assume
that eavesdroppers are beyond one meter away, otherwise
they suffer from high risk of exposures. Therefore Puzzle is
robust against eavesdropping.
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(a) An object moves between Alice and Bob with a certain tem-
poral pattern and Eve overhears the transmission from Alice to
Bob.
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Figure 5: Performance: Leakage
4.2.3 Leakage
Towards validating the resistance to the planned movement
attacker (cf. Section 2), we compared the leakage perfor-
mance of a the state-of-the-art RSS-based method ABSG
and Puzzle by moving an object across the transmission
path between Alice and Bob, while placing an eavesdropper
near Bob, as shown in Figure 5a. Since ABSG like many
other RSS-based methods asks the two communicating ends
to drop some RSS values based on certain thresholds and
to exchange the indices of those values, Eve knows exactly
which RSS probe is used by Bob but dropped by herself. In
this case, we assume that Eve makes a random guess as to
the quantization result with a success rate of 50%. We cal-
culate the mismatch rate of Eve’s and Bob’s bits to be the
combination of the actual mismatch rate between them and
the failure rate of the random guess. And again, we segment
the frequency response curves into four pieces.
Fig 5b shows the leakage of our algorithm against that of
ABSG over a distance from 10 cm to 50 cm. It is clear that
Puzzle is much more insensitive to the threat of planned
movement. Furthermore, due to the fact that Puzzle has a
much higher secret generation rate (4∗log(3) ≈ 6.3 bits/pkt)
than ASBG (1 bits/pkt), the non-leaked secret produced by
Puzzle is much larger. Fig 5c shows the result. It is worth
noting that although 4 wavelength might not sound like a
large distance in practice, our blocking objects are not large
either. The variations induced by larger obstacles, like a
train passing by or the example mentioned above, might
impact a much larger distance in practice.
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